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This paper examines the implications of a "major-risk" approach to
health insurance using thta from the National Medical Expenditure Sur-
vey. We study the impact of switching fromexisting coverage to a policy
with a 50 percent coinsurance rate and 10 percent of income limit on out-
of-pocket expenditures, as well as several alternative combinations of a
high-coinsurance rate with a limited out-of-pocket payment. Our analy-
sis is limited to the population under age 65.
Although 80 percent of spending on physicians and hospital care is
done by the 20 percent of families who spend over $5,000 in a year, our
analysis shows that shifting to a major risk policy could reduce aggre-
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gate health spending by nearly 20 percent. The reductions would be
greatest among higher income individuals.
By reducing the excess consumption of health services, the major risk
policy increases aggregate economic efficiency. The extent of the in-
crease in efficiency depends on demand elasticities and the extent of risk
aversion. With modest values of both demand sensitivity and risk aver-
sion, we find that shifting to a major risk policy would raise aggregate
national efficiency by $34 billion a year. Greater demand sensitivity and!
or greater risk sensitivity imply even larger gains.
Government provision of a major risk policy to everyone under the
age of 65 could be financed with a premium of about $150 per person
because of the increased tax revenue and reduced Medicare outlays that
would result from the provision of universal major risk insurance for the
population under age 65. Even without government provision, individu-
als might be induced to select major risk policies by changing existing tax
rules to eliminate the advantage of insurance, either by includingem-
ployer provided insurance in taxable income or by permitting a tax de-
duction for out-of-pocket medical expenditures.
The purpose of insurance is to protect individuals against unexpected
expenses. At the same time, the presence of insurance alters the behav-
ior of the insured in ways that increase the expected magnitude of
losses. Therefore, designing the optimal insurance policy involves bal-
ancing the gains from protection against the losses that result from the
distortion of behavior.1
The character of actual health insurance in the United States reflects not
only the balancing of protection and distortion but also the special incen-
tives created by the tax law. The U.S. tax law permits employers to deduct
their payments for health insurance as a cost of business while excluding
those premiums from the taxable income of employees. This rule substan-
tially lowers the individual's cost of employer-provided health care
through insurance. For an individual with a 30-percent marginal tax rate,
a $1 health insurance premium costs only 70 cents of after-tax income.
This makes it personally optimal to have much more complete insurance
than would otherwise be chosen.2
1On the general problem of the design of optimal insurance, see Borch (1968), Gould
(1969), Mossin (1968), Pashigian, Schkade, and Menefee (1966), and Smith (1968); the
theory is reviewed in Laffont (1990). Some of the specific problems of designing health
insurance are discussed in Arrow (1964) and Zeckhauser (1970).
2Feldstein and Allison (1974) discuss the relation between the tax exclusion and insurance
coverage. An explicit calculation of the effect of the exclusion on the individually optimal
level of insurance is presented in Feldstein and Friedman (1977). More recent research onA Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform105
This more complete insurance results in higher spending onmedical
care and an increased welfare lossfrom insurance. An individual with a
20-percent coinsurance rate increases health care spendinguntil the last
dollar of services brings a benefit that the individualvalues at only 20
cents. Since the cost of providing that dollar ofservices is a dollar, there
is an 80-cent welfare loss on that last dollar of spending.Because the
extent of the distortion in the structureof insurance (i.e., in the
coinsurance rate) can be very substantial, the welfareloss that results
from the excessive health care spending can also be verylarge.3
In an earlier paper, Feldstein (1971a) suggested that an insurancepoi-
icy that combined a 50-percent coinsurance rate with a maximumout-of-
pocket limit of 10 percent of income would cause mostindividuals to be
more sensitive than under existinginsurance to the costs of health care
while protecting them against the financial hardship thatwould result
from medical expenses that are a very large share of income.The present
paper examines the implicationsof such a "major risk insurance" ap-
proach in the context of today's medical marketplace. Morespecifically,
we use newly available data onhealth care spending collected by the
National Medical Expenditure Survey (Agency for HealthCare Policy
and Research, 1991) to answer four questions:
Given the existing distribution of health carespending, is it possi-
ble to limit total out-of-pocket spending to a moderate percentof income
while still having a sizeable fraction of health spendingdone by individu-
als who are facing a large coinsurance rate on the margin?Although this
seemed plausible in the early 1970s, reliable data were notavailable to
answer the question. Moreover,because health care costs have risen
much faster than income since 1970, an out-of-pocketspending limit of
10 percent of income and a 50-percent coinsurance ratemight leave too
many people at the limit to provide auseful overall incentive to reduce
excessive health care spending.
How would a major risk insurance structure with ahigh co-
insurance rate and an income related out-of-pocket maximumaffect indi-
viduals at different income levels?
What are the explicit welfare effects of shifting from existing insur-
ance coverage to major riskinsurance? Substituting a major risk insurance
policy would reduce the welfare loss that now resultsfrom consuming
health care services that are worth less than they cost toproduce. But the
effect on the risk that individuals bear is ambiguous.The higher
the relation between tax rules and health insurance includesthat by Gruber and Poterba
(1994a,b).
Feldstein (1973) discusses the welfare cost of excess health insurance.106Feldstein & Gruber
coinsurance rate would increase the amount of out-of-pocket risk for
many individuals. For them, the gain in reduced distortion must be bal-
anced against the loss of increased risk bearing. Forsome individuals,
however, the maximum out-of-pocket limit would lower their riskso that
the gain from decreased risk bearing would reinforce the gain fromre-
duced distortion. The extent of these gains and losses dependson the
distribution of income and spending andon the parameters of demand
and of risk aversion that are discussed below.
(4) Could a publicly provided major risk insurance policy be financed
by eliminating the current favorable tax treatment of healthinsurance
premiums paid by employers?
1. THE NATIONAL MEDICAL EXPENDITURE SURVEY
DATA
The present analysis utilizes a remarkable body of data collected by the
Agency for Health Care Policy and Research in 1987. The NationalMedi-
cal Expenditure Survey (NMES) began with a population sample in
which individuals were asked about their consumption of healthser-
vices, and about the identity of their employers and insurancecompa-
nies (if they purchased insurance on their own). Employers and insurers
were then asked for details on the individual's insurance plan. Inter-
views with providers were used to obtain detailed informationon the
utilization of insured health services to supplement the informationre-
ported by the individuals themselves.4
In order to have a distribution of health spending that represents what
a well-insured family or individual would spend, we have restricted
attention to families in which all members are covered by a privategroup
insurance policy. Our sample is also restricted by eliminatingany insur-
ance unit with someone who is over 65 years old (since they would be
covered by the federal government's Medicare program). The finalsam-
ple contains approximately 63% of families withno member over age 65.
The resulting sample has 6,000 insurance units, either individualsor
families.5 We use the NMES weights on these observations toreweight
For some categories of spending, such as hospital services, spending from eachevent
reported by the individuals was corroborated with the provider. For other categories, such
as physician visits, only a subsample of spending events was corroborated, and the result-
ing evidence was used to adjust reported spending for the remaining events.
An insurance unit can be an individual or a Census familyor any subgroup that has
separate insurance coverage. For example, an adult child living at home would bepart of
the Census family but would generally be a separate insurancegroup.A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform107
our sample by income and demographic group toobtain national totals
with the correct income and demographic mix.6 Since the data were
collected for 1987, we adjust the individual amounts of income and
health care spending to projected 1995 levels. Income is adjusted from
1987 to 1995 by a factor of 1.583, reflecting the increase in nominal per
capita income. Health care spending is adjusted by the growth rate in
per capita personal health expenditure on doctorsand hospitals as pro-
jected to 1995 by the Congressional Budget Office (Congressional Bud-
get Office, 1993).
The weighted mean level of spending in this well-insured group of
under-65-year-olds at 1995 levels was $3,985. The distribution of spend-
ing is very skewed. While 39 percent of insurance units spend lessthan
$500, their spending constitutes only 1.5 percent of total spending. In
contrast, only one-sixth of insurance units spend more than $5,000,but
their spending constitutes almost 80 percent of total spending. Table 1
presents the distribution of spending, indicating the fractionof insur-
ance units with spending below that limitand the fraction of total health
care dollars spent below that limit.
The existing private group insurance policies require insurance units
to pay deductibles and coinsurance payments thattogether represent an
average of 39 percent of gross spending ondoctors and hospitals. This
number is surprisingly high, given the well-insured group which we
observe.8
Table 2 shows the distribution of this out-of-pocket spending. The
distribution is even more skewed than the total spending distribution,
with the top 4 percent of spenders accounting for almost 40 percent of
out-of-pocket spending. The fact that 83 percent of the sample has out-
of-pocket spending below $1,000 in a year under their existing health
insurance plans suggests that there is some scope for demand reduction
under an Mm-type plan.
6Such a reweighting is important because, for example, our average unweighted sample
member is richer than the average population member. We cannot adjust, however, for the
possibility of self-selection in either insurance status or in the characteristics of the individ-
ual's insurance plan.
We use the term health care spending as a shorthand for the spending onphysicians and
hospitals. We exclude other categories of spending because they may not be covered by
these individuals' private insurance plans.
8Of course, the marginal copayment rate on the last dollar of spending will be somewhat
below this average copayment rate, which confounds the effects of deductibles, copay-
ment rates, and out-of-pocket maxima. To the extent that the marginal copayment ratein
the individual's original insurance plan is lower, it will strengthen the expenditurereduc-
ing effects of our MET plan.108Feldstein & Gruber
TABLE 1.
Distribution of Health Care Spending
Note: Estimates refer to total spending on physician and hospital services in 1995 by the population
under age 65. See text for further description.
2. WOULD A MAJOR RISK INSURANCE POLICY
REDUCE EXCESSIVE SPENDING?
The very skewed distribution of health care spending raises the question
of whether a limit of 10 percent on the out-of-pocket health spending
would leave many dollars of health spending exposed to a substantial
copayment rate. For example, a major risk insurance policy with a 50-
percent copayment rate and an out-of-pocket limit of 10 percent of income
would cause a family with $35,000 of income to be sensitiveon spending
below $7,000 but then to have a zero marginal price for health spending
above $7,000. The distribution in Table 1 shows that 68 percent of spend-
ing is incurred by insurance units that spend more than $7,000.
More generally, the combination of a 50-percent coinsurance rate and






Spending group Mean spending pdf cdf pdf cdf
Under 500 151 38.9 38.9 1.5 1.5
500-1,000 728 13.4 52.3 2.4 3.9
1,000-1,500 1,235 8.5 60.8 2.6 6.5
1,500-2,000 1,718 5.1 65.9 2.2 8.7
2,000-2,500 2,242 3.5 69.4 2.0 10.7
2,500-3,000 2,738 3.5 72.9 2.4 13.1
3,000-3,500 3,246 2.7 75.6 2.2 15.3
3,500-4,000 3,705 1.8 77.4 1.7 17.0
4,000-4,500 4,249 1.8 79.2 1.9 18.9
4,500-5,000 4,764 1.5 80.7 1.8 20.7
5,000-6,000 5,489 2.7 83.4 3.8 24.5
6,000-7,000 6,439 2.3 85.7 3.7 28.2
7,000-8,000 7,498 1.7 87.4 3.2 31.4
8,000-9,000 8,495 1.8 89.2 3.8 35.2
9,000-10,000 9,495 1.1 90.3 2.6 37.8
10,000-15,000 12,139 4.1 94.4 12.4 50.2
15,000-20,000 17,414 1.8 96.2 7.7 57.9
20,000-25,000 22,569 1.1 97.3 5.6 63.5
Over 25,000 52,804 2.7 100.0 36.1 100.0
Total 3,985 82.5 million 329 billionA Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform109
TABLE 2.
Distribution of Out-of-Pocket Health Care Spending
Note: Estimates refer to out-of-pocket spending on physician and hospital services in 1995by the
population under age 65. See text for further description.
sensitive if their health spending is less than 20 percent of their income
and insensitive if their spending is above that amount. The NMESdata
imply that only 11 percent of nonaged insurance units spend 20 percent
or more of their income on health care butthat 64 percent of total spend-
ing is spent by that 11 percent. A major risk insurance policy with a 50-
percent coinsurance rate and a 10-percent of income maximumout-of-
pocket amount can therefore reduce excessive spending by shrinking
the spending of the 89 percent of insurance units who collectivelyspend
36 percent of the total health dollars.
An alternative major risk insurance policy that combines a 50-percent
coinsurance rate with a 15-percent of income maximumout-of-pocket
limit implies that individuals would be sensitive on incrementalspend-
ing if they spend less than 30 percent of their income on health care.
According to the NMES data, such a major risk insurance policywould
be able to shrink the spending of 92 percent of insurance unitswho
spend 45 percent of total health spending.
The effect on health care spending of raising coinsurance ratesfrom
current levels to 50 percent depends on the price elasticity ofdemand for
health care. Because there is considerable uncertainty surroundingthe






pdf cdf pdf cdf
0 0 20.43 20.43 0 0
1-50 26 6.13 26.56 0.21 0.21
50-100 73 8.47 35.03 0.83 1.04
100-250 169 16.70 51.73 3.77 4.81
250-500 362 15.58 67.31 7.55 12.36
500-750 612 8.36 75.67 6.85 19.21
750-1,000 863 6.89 82.56 7.9627.17
1,000-1,500 1,209 6.81 89.37 11.0238.19
1,500-2,000 1,736 3.15 92.52 7.3345.52
2,000-2,500 2,216 2.09 94.61 6.2151.73
2,500-3,000 2,757 1.40 96.01 5.1856.91
3,000-3,500 3,237 0.92 96.93 3.9960.90
3,500-5,000 4,117 1.33 98.26 7.3568.25
over 5,000 13,727 1.73 100.00 31.73100.00
Total 747 82.5 million62 billion110Feldstein & Gruber
tions of elasticities of0.33and0.50.We believe that these values are
likely to be relatively modest as estimates of the long-runresponse of the
health care system to changes in coinsurance rates.9
Our analysis assumes that spending in excess of 10 percent of income
reverts to the spending under the current insurance coverage. Almost all
people with private group insurance are already ata zero coinsurance
rate when their gross medical spending reaches20percent of income,
the level at which the 10-percent maximum out-of-pocket limit in the
alternative major risk insurance policy reduces the coinsurance rateto
zero. Even though the cash price is then zero, utilization is limited by a
combination of provider decisions and patientconcerns about the risk,
discomfort, and time loss associated with increased utilization of care.1°
Table3shows the effect of alternative major risk insurance policieson
health care spending, with that spending decomposed to show the
amount paid out-of-pocket and by the insurance company. The first line
of the table shows the spending under the existinggroup insurance
coverage as reported in the NMES data.11 The average spending per
insurance unit is$3,985(at1995price levels). Of this, the average out-of-
pocket spending is $747, and the remaining$3,238is paid by the insur-
The RAND national health insurance experiment (Manning et al., 1987; Newhouse, 1993)
estimated an elasticity of health care spending with respect to the net-of-insurance costper
dollar of care of only 0.2. We believe that the RAND procedure of giving different insur-
ance coverage to a random sample of individuals is likely to underestimate the effect on
utilization of a community-wide change in coinsurance rates. Changing the policy of
isolated individuals, as the Rand experiment did, may change the wiffingness of patients to
visit a physician but wifi not alter the character of the care given prescribed by physicians
or the sophistication of the services provided by hospitals. Earlier (nonexperimental) litera-
hire on the price elasticity of demand for health care is reviewed by Phelps (1992). Esti-
mates of the elasticity of demand for hospital care range from 0.47 (Davis and Russell,
1972) to 0.67 (Feldstein, 1971b), and for doctor care from 0.14 (Phelps and Newhouse,
1972) to 1 (for hospital outpatient visitsDavis and Russell, 1972).
10This assumption is subject to two offsetting biases. First, we understate the potential
gain from the major risk insurance policy by assuming (in effect) that there is onlyone
"draw" from the distribution of medical spending per year. A more realistic picture for
spending is one of a series of smaller spending decisions throughout the year. In thiscase,
spending on the "early" events will be reduced by the 50-percent coinsurance rate under
the MRI plan, even if that family eventually exceeds the maximum out-of-pocket amount.
On the other hand, for some low-income individuals, the maximum out-of-pocket amount
may be below the maximum that the family faced under their ex ante insurance plans. For
those persons, we do not account for the fact that we are lowering their price tozero above
20 percent of their income, so that we overstate the gains from a major risk policy.
11Recall that we are analyzing only those nonaged individuals and families in the NMES
data that have group insurance and that this subsample of the population is thenre-
weighted to correspond to the national nonaged population. Estimates are presented for
national aggregate spending and for spending per "insurance unit." The insurance units
are the actual individuals and families that are separately insured in the NMES sample.A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform111
TABLE 3.
Expenditure Effects of Alternative Major Risk Insurance Plans
Note: All figures in 1995 dollars. "Average" columns refer to calculations per insurance unit; "Aggregate" columns
refer to calculations for the nation as a whole, and they are in billions of dollars. See text for further details.
ers.'2 These amounts per insurance unit correspond to an aggregate
spending on physician and hospital services by the nonaged population
of $329 billion.
The next three lines show the effect of the basic 50-10 major risk
insurance plan that has a 50-percent coinsurance rate on all spending
until out-of-pocket spending reaches 10 percent of income. With a zero
price elasticity, the only effect of the major risk policy is to shift the
burden of the cost from the insurance company to the individuals Aggre-
gate out-of-pocket payments rise by 51 percent from $61.1 billion to $93.0
billion, but there is no change in the $328.7 billion total cost of care.
With a price elasticity of 0.33, aggregate total spending falls by $60
billion to $268.7 billion, a decline of 18 percent. It is striking that even
though the higher coinsurance rate applies to only 36 percent of spend-
ing and the elasticity is a modest 0.33, the major risk policy reduces total
spending by $60 billion a year or 18 percent of the aggregate baseline
spending. Because total spending is reduced, out-of-pocket spending is
only 17 percent higher, rising from $747 per insurance unit under the
existing policy to $873 per insurance unit under the major risk policy.
12It is interesting to note that, despite that fact that the average coinsurance rate under
existing private insurance plans in our sample is almost 40 percent, the average out-of-
pocket amount is less than 20 percent of the average total spending. This reflects the fact












Original 747 3,2383,985 61.6 267.2328.7
Plan 50-10 0 1,127 2,8573,985 93.0 235.7328.7
0.33 873 2,3853,257 72.0 196.7268.7
0.5 768 1,9902,758 63.3 164.2227.5
Plan 50-15 0 1,292 2,6933,985 106.6 222.2328.7
0.33 959 2,0943,052 79.1 172.7251.8
0.5 828 1,7312,559 68.3 142.8211.1
Plan 100-150 2,011 1,9743,985 165.9 162.8328.7
0.33 1,367 1,6653,032 112.8 137.3250.1
0.5 1,100 1,2562,356 90.8 103.6194.4112Feldstein & Gruber
A long-run price elasticity of 0.50 implies that, in the long run, a major
risk policy would reduce total spending by 31 percent or $101 billion a
year. With this elasticity, there is essentially no increase in out-of-pocket
spending. The decline in the total spending almost exactly balances the
increased share paid out of pocket, causing the out-of-pocket amount
per insured to rise from $747 to only $768. The amount paid by the
insurers and, therefore, the insurance premium declines by $1,248 per
insurance unit or 39 percent.
Thus, even with the very skewed distribution of health spending that
we now observe, the major risk structure of a high coinsurance rate and
a 10 percent of income limit on out-of-pocket spending can reduce total
spending very substantially and leave average out-of-pocket spending
unchanged, if the demand elasticity is as high as 0.S.0
The next three lines of Table 3 show the effect of increasing the maxi-
mum out-of-pocket amount to 15 percent of income while keeping the
coinsurance rate at 50 percent. Since this 50-percent increase in the maxi-
mum out-of-pocket limit only increases the number of cost-sensitive
insurance units from 89 percent of all units to 92 percent and only in-
creases the fraction of spending that is cost-sensitive from 36 percent to
45 percent, the effect on total spending is relatively small. With a price
elasticity of 0.5, aggregate total spending is $211 billion or $16 billion less
than with a 10 percent of income out-of-pocket limit. Average out-of-
pocket spending rises to $828.
One final alternative worth considering is a deductible plan. The last
three lines refer to a plan with a deductible (i.e., a 100-percentco-
insurance rate) equal to 15 percent of family income. The insured are
subject to the same maximum risk as under the 50-15 plan but are
sensitive over a much smaller range of costs (up to 15 percent of income
instead of 30 percent). Although the sensitivity range is smaller, the 100-
percent coinsurance rate makes the individuals more responsive within
this range. This greater sensitivity does outweigh the narrower range of
sensitivity, causing total spending to be nearly $17 billion lower under
the 100-15 plan than under the 50-15 plan. Although this total cost
saving is achieved without exposing individuals to a higher maximum
out-of-pocket spending than under the 50-15 plan, the use of the deduct-
ible rather than the 50-percent coinsurance rate increases the average out-
13Such a program would also affect the incentive to earn and report income, since higher
income implies a higher copayment rate under the MRI plan. For the average person,
however, the disincentive is likely to be small; as shown in Table 4, average out-of-pocket
expenditures do not rise very steeply with income. This disincentive is largest for the
person who will exceed his or her out-of-pocket maximum with certainty; under our 50-10



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of-pocket spending from $828 per insurance unit to $1,100per insurance
unit. This is because the deductible plan increases the out-of-pocket
spending in the more likely part of the spending distribution.
Before presenting an explicit welfare analysis that combines the effects
of the reduced distortion (i.e., the lower total spending) and the changes
in individual risk bearing, we look briefly at the way that the major risk
policies affect individuals at different income levels.
3. HOW DOES MAJOR RISK INSURANCE AFFECT
DIFFERENT INCOME GROUPS?
Because the maximum out-of-pocket payment is limited to 10 percent of
income, the major risk policy pays substantiallymore for lower-income
individuals and families than it does for higher-incomegroups. In com-
parison with the existing structure of insurance, the result isa substan-
tial redistribution in favor of lower-income groups. This redistribution is
in addition to any redistribution that occurs in extendingcoverage to
those low-income individuals who are currently uninsured.
Table 4 divides the population into four different incomegroups and
shows for each group the patterns of spending under the existing insur-
ance coverage and under the 50-10 major risk plan. Before one examines
the effects of the major risk insurance, it is worth noting that theaverage
level of spending under the initial insurance coverage differs substan-
tially among the four income groups. The group of individuals below
poverty has by far the highest initial level of spending per insurance
unit. This may be a reflection of the way that these dataare constructed
rather than an accurate picture of the spending of below-povertygroups
in the population as a whole. The data presented hereare based on the
rather unlikely combination of being below poverty but still insured bya
private group policy. One way that individuals might find themselves in
such a situation is by becoming very ill while working fora firm that
provides group insurance, causing them to leave their jobs, but retain
their health insurance.14 This distortion of the baseline spending pattern
changes the specific numerical values presented in the current section
but does not alter the basic conclusion that major risk policiesare particu-
larly favorable to lower-income individuals.15
14 Federal legislation under the Consolidated Omnibus Reconciliation Act of1986 (CO-
BRA) mandated that individuals who left jobs where they were covered by health insur-'
ance plans could continue to purchase that insurance at the average group rate. Huth
(1991) and Long and Marquis (1992) find that such continuation coverage is in fact takenup
by the sickest job leavers.
15 As a check on the results in this section,we have prepared estimates of the distributional
effect of the income-related out-of-pocket maximum for a "synthetic" population that isA Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform115
Two features stand out in Table 4. First, the average out-of-pocket
spending under the major risk plan rises very sharply as income rises,
reflecting the fact that the maximum out-of-pocket spending rises in
proportion to income. With no behavioral response, the average out-of-
pocket spending rises from $421 in the below-poverty group to $908 in
the group between poverty and twice poverty and eventually to $1,854
in the highest income group. In the lowest income group, the average
out-of-pocket spending under the major risk plan is less than one-third
of the baseline level under the ex ante insurance policy, while in the
highest income group the average spending under the major risk plan is
more than twice the baseline level.
Although the behavioral response to higher coinsurance diminishes
the strength of this effect, it remains true even with a price elasticity of
0.5. Out-of-pocket spending goes from less than one-third of the base-
line level in the below-poverty group to 30 percent above the baseline
level in the highest income group.
The second noticeable feature is that the major risk plan reduces the
total consumption of health care much more for high-income individuals
than for lower-income individuals This reflects the fact that the higher
coinsurance rate applies to an increasing share of spending as income
rises. With a price elasticity of 0.5, the lowest income group sees total
aggregate health spending decline by only 7.4 percent (from $44.5 billion
to $41.2 billion). Among those with incomes between poverty and twice
poverty, health spending declines by 26 percent, and in the highest
income group, it declines by 44 percent. Thus, the MRI plan reduces
total spending in a way that favors lower-income individuals or families.
4. THE WELFARE ECONOMICS OF MAJOR RISK
INSURANCE16
Substituting a major risk policy for existing health insurance has two
effects on individual welfare. It reduces the deadweight loss that results
assumed to have the same random distribution of spending for each demographic group
regardless of income, thus purging the data of the problematic correlation between spend-
ing and income documented in Table 3. The method of doing this analysis and the results
are presented in the Appendix to this paper. Those results confirm the general characteris-
tics described in this section of the paper.
16This section follows the approach developed in Feldstein (1973). A major difference is
that the current paper uses the actual distribution of gross spending, while Feldstein (1973)
used very aggregate data to estimate the probability of hospital admission and the parame-
ters of a gamma distribution that was taken to represent the conditional distribution of
spending. In order to make the analysis tractable with the resulting mixed poisson-gamma
distribution process, the utility function had to be assumed to be one of constant absolute
risk aversion.116Feldstein & Gruber
from the excessive consumption of health care services induced by the
very low marginal cost of care under existing insurance policies. It also
alters the risk distribution that the individual faces, increasing the risk of
modest spending but limiting the maximum risk. The reduction in the
deadweight loss is an unambiguous benefit, while the sign of the wel-
fare effect of the change in the risk distribution is ex ante ambiguous,
depending on the distribution of health care spending and on the indi-
vidual's utility function.17
We simplify the welfare calculations by assuming that the two welfare
effects can be evaluated separately and added together. We also convert
the welfare changes into equivalent income variations and then aggre-
gate by adding those equivalent income variation measures over all in-
surance units in the population.
4.1 The Reduced Distortion of Health Care Spending
Figure 1 shows our approach to measuring the individual gain from
reduced distortion. We measure the unit of health care so that its price in
the absence of insurance is 1.18 The existing insurance policy has a
coinsurance rate of P0. which is the net of insurance price to the con-
sumer. Conditional on the individual's medical condition, the individual
consumes E0 units of care. The deadweight loss caused by the induced
increase in health spending is given by the area of the triangle ACD.
The major risk policy raises the coinsurance rate for that individual to
P1 (if the resulting out-of-pocket cost is below the maximum out-of-
pocket amount) and reduces the consumption of health care to E1. This
reduces the deadweight loss by the shaded area BCDE, which is equal to
(E0 - E1)*(1 - P1) + 0.5* (P - P)*(E - E1).
The reduction in the deadweight loss implied by the simple analysis of
Figure 1 varies from individual to individual, depending on the individ-
ual's medical condition and, therefore, on the initial level of health care
spending, E0. For each individual, the reduction in the deadweight loss
is readily calculated for any major risk coinsurance rate (P1) on the basis
of the available data (E0 and P0 as reported in the NMES survey) and the
assumed price elasticity of demand since E1 = E0 (P0/]?1) whereis the
17Even in a world where most households have reached the point of zero copay under
their old plans by the time that they hit their MRI out-of-pocket maximum (as assumed
earlier), MRI can still lower their risk because it reduces the amount of spending below the
max. Consider the example of the person with $20,000 of income and a $2,500 deductible.
This person will be sensitive to medical spending for a greater range under the MRI plan
(up to $4,000) but will face a lower out-of-pocket risk (the maximum MM expenditure
being $2,000).
18Our analysis assumes that health care services are supplied at constant cost so that no
change in producers' surplus need be taken into account.Prices
P1
P0
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C
E1 E0 Expenditures
FIGURE 1: The Deadweight Loss of Excess Insurance
absolute value of the price elasticity. As noted earlier, if the individual's
spending is over the maximum out-of-pocket level, our analysis assumes
that the major risk insurance policy has no effect on utilization and,
therefore, no effect on the deadweight loss.19
Even at our highest elasticity assumptions, there is a further reason
why our calculation may understate the gain from reduced spending in
the long run. The initial level of spending may exceed what consumers
would really want even at the initial price because the physicians who
make the detailed health care choices, instead of acting as the agents of
their patients, prescribe additional care. Such excessive care could arise
because of a concern about medical malpractice, physician preferences
for practicing a technically more sophisticated style of medical care, or
because it is in the physician's own financial interest to prescribe more
extensive care. With increased patient cost sharing, patient sensitivity to
the increased costs of care arising from such physician behavior may
counteract these supply side tendencies.
19Once again, our analysis may understate the potential gain from the major risk insur-
ance policy by assuming that there is only one "draw" from the distribution of medical
spending per year. A more realistic picture in which spending for the year is the result of a
series of spending decisions creates the possibility that total spending will be reduced even
though the individual eventually spends enough to exceed the maximum out-of-pocket
limit since the "early" spending decisions in the year were influenced by the high
coinsurance rate.118Feldstein & Gruber
4.2 The Change in Risk Bearing
To calculate the effect of the change in the individual's risk bearing, we
ask, for each insurance unit in our sample, what that unit would have to
be paid to assume the additional risk implied by the increased coinsurance
rate (or would pay if the risk-limiting effect of the maximum out-of-pocket
limit outweighs the increased risk of the higher coinsurance rate). We
then aggregate these amounts over the population as a whole.
More formally, we assume that each individual has utility that is a
function of net nonhealth consumption, defined as the difference be-
tween that individual's income (Y') and the random out-of-pocket expen-
diture X01: that is, U(Y - X01). Thus, the expected utility of the individual
is E {LJ(Y - X01)} where the expectation is over the different possible
values of X01. The uncertain distribution of out-of-pocket payments can
be summarized by the certainty equivalent CO3 a fixed amount such that
LI(r - C01)}. = E {U(Y' - X0)}.
The shift to the major risk policy replaces each individual's out-of-
pocket distribution X0' with a new out-of-pocket distribution Xi'. Since
the difference between the mean values of X0 and X1 is simply a transfer
between the insured and the insurer, we calculate the certainty equiva-
lence of the new out-of-pocket risk distribution with an adjustment (
,0i)to make the mean of the new risk distribution equal to the mean
value of the initial distribution (i.e., we evaluate the mean preserving
spread in risk). Thus, we define the certainty equivalence payment C1 as:
E {U(r - X1 + /L,hi)} = U(Y1- C11).
The difference between the two certainty equivalence values, C1z - CO3
measures the change in the value that the individual attributes to risk
bearing. We add these certainty equivalence differences over individuals
just as we added the value of the reduced distortion.
To make this approach operational, we need to specify a particular
utility function and a method of calculating expected utility. Our analysis
uses the constant relative risk aversion utility function 11(Z) = - (lip) Z ,
which implies that the relative risk aversion is - U"iZ U' = p + 1. A special
case of this, the logarithmic utility function 11(Z) = ln Z, corresponds to
p = 0. For our numerical calculations, we examine twovalues of risk
aversion: the logarithmic case with constant relative risk aversion of 1 and
the more risk averse case with constant relative risk aversion of 3 (p = 2).
These values essentially contain the range of estimated coefficients of
relative risk aversion in the macroeconomics literature (Zeldes, 1989).
To calculate expected values, we first create distributions of spending
under the existing insurance for each of four demographic types of insur-
ance units in our NMES data: single adults, single adults with children,A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform119
couples, and couples with children. To create each distribution, we rank
all of the observations of that demographic type, divide the rank list into
100 equal intervals, and assign a probability of 0.01 to each interval. To
calculate the expected utility for each individual under the initial insur-
ance, E U {Y - X0}, we draw 50 observations from the relevant demo-
graphic distribution and calculate the average utility for that insurance
unit (given its income). In this way we combine the (reweighted) income
distribution of the NMES data and the demographic-specific cumulative
frequency distributions of spending.2° To calculate expected utility for
any major risk insurance plan, we repeat the same process with the
additional step of transforming the out-of-pocket spending from the
initial level to the level corresponding to the major risk coinsurance rate
and elasticity of demand.
4.3 Results
The results of the analysis are presented in Table 5 for the three major
risk plans and demand elasticity values that we considered in Table 3
and for the two different measures of constant relative risk aversion.
Consider first the welfare gain from reducing the insurance-induced
distortion of demand. The first row of the table is based on the 50-10
major risk plan with a zero price elasticity of demand and a constant
relative risk aversion of 1. Since the zero price elasticity implies that
shifting from existing insurance to the major risk plan involves no
change in behavior, there is no welfare gain from reduced distortion.
With a demand elasticity of 0.33, shown in the next row, there is a
reduced distortion. The reduced deadweight loss is equal to $534 per
insurance unit, approximately 13 percent of the initial spending level
and 73 percent of the reduced spending shown in Table 3. A demand
elasticity of 0.5 increases the value of the reduced distortion to $902 per
insurance unit.
The major risk plan with a 50-percent coinsurance rate but a wider
range of sensitivity corresponding to a maximum out-of-pocket limit of
15 percent of income causes slightly greater reductions in distortion.
With an elasticity of 0.5, the value of the reduced distortion is $1,045 per
insurance unit (instead of the $902 reported for the 50-10 policy.)
20Our method assumes that the distribution of spending within each demographic group
is independent of the level of income. An alternative procedure of grouping individuals by
broad income group as well as demographic group would allow us to relax this assump-
tion, but, by giving us a smaller sample for each group, would make the resulting distribu-
tion less reliable. Because of the importance to our analysis of the relatively infrequent
large expenditures, we have chosen to use the larger samples to calculate the cumulative
distributions for each demographic group rather than recognizing the possible relation
between income and spending.120Feldstein & Gruber
TABLE 5.
Welfare Economics of Alternative Plans
Aggregate
Per Family net gain
Reduced Increased Net gain or loss
Plan Elasticity distortion risk or loss (billions)
CRRA 1
Note: All figures in 1995 dollars. CRRA is the level of constant relative risk aversion. Reduced distortion
is the reduction in deadweight loss from reduced spending; increased risk is the (potential) increase in
the certainty equivalent of the higher risk that individuals bear under the plan. Negative numbers
indicate reduced risk in risk column, and a net welfare loss in the net gain or loss column. See text for
additional details.
Replacing the 50-percent coinsurance rate with a deductible equal to
15 percent of income (the 100-15 plan) causes lower average levels of
spending (as indicated in Table 3) but reduces the average deadweight
loss of distortion by less. For example, with an elasticity of 0.5 the 50-15
plan reduces average spending relative to the initial level by $1,426,
while the 100-15 plan reduces average spending $1,629. In contrast, the
value of the reduced distortion associated with the 50-15 plan is $1,045,
while the value of the reduced distortion associated with the 100-15 plan
is only $735. The reason that the deductible reduces spending by more
but the deadweight loss by less is that deductibles reduce spending
within a smaller range. Since some of the spending in that range was
valued by the consumer, the reduced DWL per dollar of reduced spend-
ing is smaller. That is, it is more efficient to maintain a high price on the
50-10 0 0 317 -317 -26.2
.33 534 118 416 34.3
.5 902 42 860 71.0
50-15 0 0 534 -534 -44.1
.33 683 288 395 32.6
.5 1,045 201 844 69.6
100-15 0 0 1,306 -1,306 -107.7
.33 426 973 -547 -45.1
.5 735 504 230 19.0
CRRA 3
50-10 0 0 -154 154 12.7
.33 534 -362 896 73.9
.5 902 -442 1,344 110.9
50-15 0 0 105 -105 -8.7
.33 683 -158 841 69.4
.5 1,045 -252 1,297 107.0
100-15 0 0 923 -923 -76.1
.33 426 570 -144 -11.9
.5 735 72 663 54.7A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform121
marginal dollar of spending than to cut spending deeply over a small
range, with a price of zero above that range.
To assess the overall welfare effect of shifting from existing insurance
to a major risk plan, these reductions in deadweight loss must be
combined with assessments of the change in risk. Consider first the
case of the 50-10 major risk plan with logarithmic utility function
(CRRA = 1). If the demand elasticity is zero (the first row of Table 5),
each individual faces the increased risk associated with a higher coin-
surance rate up to the maximum out-of-pocket limit but then may have
less risk than under the existing ordinary insurance plan. On average,
individuals would be indifferent between the new and riskier distribu-
tion and the initial distribution plus a certainty equivalent charge of
$317. The net welfare effect of the major risk insurance plan when
individuals have a zero demand elasticity, therefore, is an average loss
of $317 per insurance unit.
The next row of Table 5 shows that the result is quite different when
the individuals have a demand elasticity of 0.33. The reduced distortion
of $534 outweighs the increased risk valued at $317, producing a net
gain of $217 per insurance unit. This understates the true net welfare
gain associated with the elasticity of 0.33 because the behavioral re-
sponse reduces the amount of out-of-pocket risk relative to what it
would be with no behavioral response (as well as reducing the distor-
tion in total spending.) Although the net out-of-pocket risk remains
greater with the 50-10 plan than with the existing plan, the combina-
tion of the greater coinsurance rate and the reduction in total spending
implies that the increased risk has a certainty equivalent change of only
$118. This is shown in the second column of Table 5. Subtracting the
value of the increased risk from the value of the reduced distortion
leaves a net gain of $416 per insurance unit. Since there are 82.5 million
insurance units, this implies an aggregate welfare gain of $34.3 billion
(shown in the last column of Table 5).
An elasticity of 0.5 implies not only a greater reduction in distortion
($902 per insurance unit) but alsO a much smaller increase in risk ($42
per insurance unit), implying a net gain from shifting to the 50-10
major risk policy of $860 per insurance unit and an aggregate net gain
of $71.0 billion.
Although extending the sensitivity range by increasing the maximum
out-of-pocket amount to 15 percent of income (the 50-15 major risk plan)
reduces distortion by more than the 50-10 plan, the gain from this
source is not enough to outweigh the increased risk bearing when the
demand elasticity is 0.5 or less. With an elasticity of 0.5, the reduced
distortion is $1,045, and the increased risk bearing is $201, implying a net122Feldstein & Gruber
gain of $844, slightly below the $860 net gain of the 50-10 plan. Compar-
ing the two plans shows that the gap decreases as the demand elasticity
increases, from a gap of $217 with no behavioral response to $21 when
the demand elasticity is 0.33 and $16 when the demand elasticity is 0.5.
The 50-15 plan only produces a greater benefit when the demand elastic-
ity exceeds 0.65.
Substituting a deductible for the 50-percent coinsurance rate is clearly
inferior. Not only is the reduced distortion less for each demand elastic-
ity, as noted above, but the value of the increased risk is also greater.
The lower half of the table considers the welfare effects if individuals
are substantially more risk averse (a constant relative risk aversion of p +
1 = 3.) The striking difference between the logarithmic utility function
and this case is that there is actually reduced risk bearing in the cases of
0.33 and 0.5 elasticity, with both the 50-10 and 50-15 plans. That is, in
these cases, the reduced risk associated with the maximum out-of-
pocket limit now outweighs the increased risk below that limit.
In fact, even with no behavioral response, the increased protection
afforded by the 10 percent of income limit on out-of-pocket expenses
outweighs the shift to the 50-percent coinsurance rate under the 50-10
plan and produces a net gain of $154 per insurance unit. With a zero price
elasticity, individuals would on average be indifferent between the out-
of-pocket risk distribution of the 50-10 major risk policy and the combina-
tion of the current insurance policy and paying a fixed lump sum of $154.
An increase in the price elasticity of demand shrinks the amount of
risk with the 50-10 plan and therefore makes the risk reduction even
greater; with an elasticity of 0.5, the reduced risk of the 50-10 plan is
worth $442 per insurance unit. Combined with the distortion reduction
worth $902 per insurance unit, the total gain is $1,344 per insurance unit
or an aggregate of $110.9 billion.
The greater risk aversion does not alter the relative attractiveness of
the three major risk plans. The 50-10 plan still has a greater welfare gain
than the 50-15 plan or the 100-15 plan.
Given the plausible range of risk aversion values that we have consid-
ered, the analysis of this section implies that the net overall welfare gain of
the 50-10 major risk plan is between $34.3 billion (with demand elasticity
of 0.33 and relative risk version of 1.0) and $110.9 billion (with a demand
elasticity of 0.50 and relative risk aversion of 3.0). The shift to a 50-10 ma-
jor risk plan would reduce aggregate welfare only with low-risk aversion
(which reduces the value of the limit on out-of-pocket spending) and a
low elasticity of demand (so that the reduced distortion is small and the
distribution of coinsurance payments is not reduced by the major risk
plan).A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform123
5. ELIMINATING THE TAX EXCLUSION TO FINANCE
GOVERNMENT PROVIDED MAJOR RISK INSURANCE
The effects of major risk insurance on health care spending and the
welfare gains from substituting a major risk plan for existing insurance
would be obtained if the major risk policies are privately selected or if
they are provided by the government Eliminating the current income
tax exclusion for employer paid health insurance premiums21 or provid-
ing for tax deductible payments for out-of-pocket expensesmight be
enough to cause individuals and their employers to choose major risk-
type insurance policies. Alternatively, major risk insurance might
be provided by the government, as originally suggested in Feldstein
(1971a).
This section examines the net cost to the government of financing
alternative major risk insurance plans as a function of the elasticity of
demand. Table 3 showed that the cost of providing the major risk insur-
ance depends on the design of the insurance and on the elasticity of
demand for services. The 50-10 plan with no induced change in demand
for health services would have a total cost of $328.7 billion of which $93.0
billion would be paid out of pocket by individuals at the time of care and
the remaining $235.7 billion would be paid by the insurer. If, however,
the demand elasticity is 0.5, the total cost of a 50-10 plan would be only
$227.5 billion of which the insurer would pay $164.2 billion.
If the government were to provide major risk insurance without
charge to the entire population, employers would no longer have a
reason to provide compensation in the form of health insurance.0 These
21Excluding employer paid health insurance from taxable income gives individuals a
strong incentive to pay for health care through insurance and, therefore, to have low
coinsurance rates. See Congressional Budget Office (1994) or Gruber and Poterba (1994b)
for an analysis of recent legislative proposals to eliminate or limit the exclusion of
employer-paid health insurance. For earlier discussions of employer payments for health
insurance in taxable wage and salary income, see Feldstein (1973), Feldstein and Allison
(1974) and Feldstein and Friedman (1977).
Tax deductibility of the out-of-pocket payments could be done directly or through tax-
deductible contributions to health savings accounts of the type that have recently been
proposed. Either way would eliminate the current incentive to buy all health care through
insurance.
Indeed, it would also be necessary to preclude additional insurance by individuals since
individuals who insured the coinsurance part of the major risk policies would be increasing
the value of those policies and the expected cost of providing them. (On the impact of
supplementary insurance on the cost of Medicare, see Pauly [1974].) Alternatively, indi-
viduals could be permitted to purchase additional insurance but only by paying a supple-
mentary premium that reflects the additional cost of the major risk insurance. It is for this
reason that having a publicly provided MRI policy would require removing the exclusion124Feldstein & Gruber
premiums would then be converted to wage and salary income and,
therefore, would be subject to income tax and FICA payroll tax. Calcula-
lions using the NMES data and the NBER's TAXSIM model indicate that
this would raise $79.0 billion in federal taxes at 1995 levels 24Eliminating
as well the deduction for medical expenditures in excess of 7.5% of ACT
is estimated to reduce the government's tax expenditures by $4.1 billion
in 1995 (Committee on Ways and Means, 1993).
The introduction of major risk insurance would also affect the outlay
side of the federal budget in two important ways. First, the major risk
policy would replace the existing Medicaid program for those below age
65 and the nondisabled. In 1995, this is a projected $50 billion, or one-
third of total federal and state Medicaid spending.Second, the in-
creased cost sensitivity of the nonaged population would alter the cost
structure of hospitals and the standards for treating different medical
conditions. These standards would presumably spill over to the treat-
ment of the Medicare population, lowering the government costs of that
program as well. If one assumes that Medicare costs declined in the
same proportion as total "private" health care spending (i.e., the spend-
ing by the population covered by major risk insurance), the reduced
spending on health care would bring substantial savings in federal out-
lays. For example, with an elasticity of 0.33 the 50-10 plan reduces total
private spending from $328.7 billion under the existing health insurance
plan to $268.7 billion, a decline of 18 percent. Applying this same decline
to the $174 billion of federal spending on Medicare implies an annual
saving of $31.3 billion at 1995 levels.26 This reduction in spending would
not only be a source of financing for the major risk plan but also an
improvement in resource allocation since these government insurance
from taxable income of medical expenses above 7.5% of AGI; this acts as a form of
reinsurance which would undercut the gains from MRI.
24Evidence in favor of the substitutability between benefits and cash wages is provided in
Gruber (1994) and Gruber and Krueger (1991). The NMES data indicate the dollar amount
of the health insurance premiums paid by employers for each health insurance unit in
1987. We have adjusted this to 1995 levels by the actual and projected growth of health care
spending per capita. Using the income data in the NMES and the NBER's TAXSIM pro-
gram, we then calculated the revenue gain that would result from converting these
employer-paid health premiums to wage and salary income.
We do not consider MRI's effects on the remainder of the Medicaid program, since most
spending on the aged consists of nursing home costs. There may be some effect on the
medical treatment of the disabled, leading to an understatement of the federal and state
Medicaid savings in our calculations.
26We recognize, of course, that any savings in either private spending or government
programs would only evolve over a number of years. We state these figures in terms of
1995 dollars even though they would only be fully achieved several years later.A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform125
programs induce an excess provision of health services in the same way
that private insurance does.
Combining the $83.1 billion increase in tax revenue and the $81.3
billion reduction in government spending provides $164.4 billion toward
the $196.7 billion total cost of providing a 50-10 major risk insurance
plan with an elasticity of 0.33. Although using the income tax or payroll
tax to finance the remaining cost of $32.3 billion a year (see line 2 of Table
6) would involve new sources of deadweight loss, this loss would almost
certainly be less than the $34.3 billion aggregate welfare gain associated
with the shift to a major risk insurance policy (see line 2 of Table 5). Even
this deadweight loss of financing cost could be avoided by using a com-
pulsory fixed-price insurance premium. With 82 million insurance units,
the cost of financing the $32.3 billion shortfall would be slightly less than
$400 per year.
Although we have not done a formal analysis, we suspect that a major
risk policy with a $700 premium would leave almost all taxpayers better
off than they are today, a reflection of the substantial overall net welfare
gain of $34.3 billion. The tangible form of this benefit would be a large
increase in net of tax wages (since employers would no longer be spend-
ing an average of about $3,200 a year on insurance premiums) and a
possible gain through reduced risk bearing if the individuals are suffi-
ciently risk averse.
A higher price elasticity of demand for health services reduces the
government's net financing costs even further. Indeed, row 3 of Table 6
shows that with a demand elasticity of 0.5 the 50-10 major risk plan
could be completely financed by a combination of taxing the wages and
salaries that result from eliminating private insurance and the savings in
federal government outlays that occur from reduced Medicare and Med-
icaid spending. The higher demand elasticity reduces the insurer's cost
to only $164.2 billion, and this is more than offset by the combination of
the $83.1 billion in additional revenue and the $102.8 billion in Medicare
and Medicaid savings.
6. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis presented in this paper shows that a health insurance plan
that has a 50-percent coinsurance rate but limits out-of-pocket spending
to 10 percent of income can substantially reduce total medical spending,
even though a substantial part of health outlays are incurred by families
spending 10 percent or more of family income on health care.
The change in health care spending reduces the deadweight loss that



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































6A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform127
tion of health care. The combination of this reduction in the deadweight
loss of excessive health care spending and the change in the risk of out-
of-pocket spending represents a net welfare gain under most plausible
assumptions about demand elasticities and risk aversion.
Our estimates of the aggregate welfare gain from shifting to the 50-10
major risk policy (a 50-percent coinsurance rate and a 10 percent of
income maximum out of pocket payment) range from $34 billion with a
low degree of risk aversion (a logarithmic utility function) and a low
price elasticity of demand (0.33) to $110 billion with a higher degree of
risk aversion (a constant relative risk aversion of 3) and higher demand
elasticity (0.5).
We show that, with a demand elasticity of 0.5, universal government
provision of this 50-10 major risk insurance policy could be financed by a
combination of the additional tax revenue that would automatically result
from the conversion to wage and salary income of the existing employer
payments for health insurance and from the reduction in Medicare and
Medicaid spending in parallel to the reduction in private health spending.
APPENDIX: "SYNTHETIC" POPULATION ESTIMATES
As noted in the text, a problem with our analysis by income class is that
the sample of low income privately insured is not likely to be a represen-
tative group. Instead, these are most likely sick individuals whose health
has impeded their earnings abilities; this is reflected in their high spend-
ing in Table 4.
Therefore, we have replicated our analysis with a "synthetic" sample
that is designed to overcome this problem. The basic idea is to replace
the individual's own spending with a random amount of spending that
is not a function of income but that reflects the demographic-adjusted
spending distribution. The method for doing so is similar to that de-
scribed in Section 4.2. We begin by dividing our sample into four demo-
graphic types of insurance units: single adults, single adults with chil-
dren, couples, and couples with children. We rank each observation
within a demographic type by spending, divide the ranked list into 100
equal intervals, and assign a probability of 0.01 to each interval. We then
assign each unit in that demographic group a spending level drawn
randomly from that distribution. Both here and in Section 4.2, we have
expanded the sample so that there are a sufficient number of observa-
tions in each demographic group. We do so by replicating our original
sample to inflate the size to 20,000 insurance units.
The results of this analysis are presented in Table Al, which parallels

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































2A Major Risk Approach to Health Insurance Reform129
ex ante distribution of spending is now flat until the highest income
group, and then somewhat higher for that group; this reflects the demo-
graphic mix of the highest income group, which is more likely to contain
(high spending) married couples with children. This contrasts with the
U-shaped pattern seen in Table 4.
The basic findings, however, are quite similar to those discussed in
the context of Table 4: There is a substantial rise in out-of-pocket spend-
ing with income under the MRE plan, and the reduction in health care
spending is much larger for higher-income than for lower-income indi-
viduals. Thus, while this approach eradicates the anomalous finding of
much higher spending for low-income individuals, the basic income
distribution effects of an Mm-type plan are unchanged.
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